In 1942, to prevent Iran from coming under German occupation and control, British and Soviet troops had moved in to occupy, respectively, the southern and northern parts of Iran. Shortly afterwards they concluded with the Shah ofIran a tripartite treaty of alliance, under which the two powers were authorised to maintain land, sea and air forces in Iranian territory 'in such numbers as they consider necessary'. The treaty provided that 'the presence of these forces on Iranian territory does not constitute a military occupation and will disturb as little as possible the administration and the security forces of Iran, the economic life of the country, the normal movements of the population and the application of Iranian laws and regulations'. Despite this provision, under the protection of the Soviet occupying forces, a local Azerbaijan government of left-wing persuasion had been established which increasingly disputed the authority of the Iranian Government.
Under the Tripartite Treaty the occupying forces were to be evacuated within six months of the end of the war - that is, by 2 March 1946. On 18 November 1945, the Iranian Government had sent its forces to reoccupy Azerbaijan. The Soviet army authorities had prevented passage of this force, declaring it would cause disturbances. The Iranian Government had then sent two notes to the Soviet Government, demanding that the Soviet army authorities in Iran should be instructed to cease intervening in Iran's internal affairs and to allow free passage to the Iranian forces, as the Treaty provided. The Soviet Government denied any interference in the affairs of the province, but declared that the passage of the Iranian government forces would result in armed conflict with the existing authorities in the area. The Iranian Goverment then declared that, from the Soviet Government's declaration that it did not wish to interfere in the affairs of the region, it assumed that Iranian forces would now be allowed to proceed. No further reply was received.
In its note of 19 January 1946 to the acting Secretary-General, the Iranian delegate declared that Soviet interference in Iranian affairs had led to a situation that could 'lead to friction'. Direct negotiations had failed. The Iranian Government therefore wished to raise the matter under Article 35 of the Charter. Under this article the Council could investigate the situation and recommend the terms of a settlement. An accusation levelled against one of the permanent members was not a happy opening to the Council's proceedings. It is open to question whether Iran was well advised to bring public charges against the Soviet Union there before bilateral negotiations had been thoroughly exhausted or before other means of pressure had been given a chance to work. It was particularly unwelcome to the Soviet Union, which had never concealed its fear that she might find herself placed in the dock by other members of the Security Council. She may well have believed that in this case Iran was acting with the encouragement of Britain, with whom she had long competed for influence there, or of the United States, her main antagonist. Since the UN, in her eyes, was an organisation whose success depended on great-power unity, she could claim that to open the Council's affairs with a charge against herself was to betray the spirit that lay behind the organisation's creation.
She immediately proceeded to retaliate by bringing to the Council charges of an exactly comparable kind against Britain. Within two days she too addressed a communication to the acting Secretary-General complaining about the interference in Greek affairs of British troops remammg in that country; while the Ukrainian delegate raised a similar charge about the presence of British forces in Indonesia. So, already, in the very first days of the Council's life, the fire and counter-fire of cold war had erupted there.
The Soviet representative also sent a letter replying to Iran's charges. The situation in Azerbaijan, he maintained, resulted from the actions of popular forces in that province seeking 'some sort of national autonomy', and had nothing at all to do with the presence of Soviet forces. The Soviet Union had negotiated with Iran on the question in November and the Iranian government had given every impression of being satisfied. There was therefore nothing now for the Council to consider. After the item was placed, without objection, on the Council's agenda, Vyshinsky, sent from Moscow to London, repeated these arguments. He denied that Article 35 or any other article of the Charter concerning peaceful settlement was relevant to the situation. The Charter called on members to settle their disputes by direct negotiation and the Soviet Union was perfectly willing to do this. The Iranian delegate repeated the charge of Soviet interference, but replied that Iran too was willing to negotiate on the matter. Meanwhile the question should remain on the agenda, and regular reports on the progress of the negotiations should be made.
The Council accepted a solution somewhat on these lines. On 30 January a resolution was passed which merely recorded the stated willingness of both parties to negotiate, and requested them to keep the Council informed of any results achieved. In this way some kind of pressure was to be maintained on the Soviet Union while the negotiations progressed. No more was heard of the subject at the UN for another two months.
Iranian People in Early Modern Persia
